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Abstract: 
 We examine cooperation in repeated interactions where intended actions are implemented 
with noise but intentions are perfectly observable. Observable intentions lead to more 
cooperation compared to control games where intentions are unobserved, allowing subjects to 
reach similar cooperation levels as in games without noise. Most subjects condition exclusively 
on intentions, and use simpler, lower-memory strategies compared to games where intentions are 
unobservable. When the returns to cooperation are high, some subjects are tolerant, using good 
outcomes to forgive attempted defections; when the returns to cooperation are low, some 
subjects are punitive, using bad outcomes to punish accidental defections. 
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1. Introduction  
This paper studies cooperation in infinitely repeated games where the intended actions 
are implemented with error, so that the actions played are only a noisy or implicit signal of what 
was intended. The possibility of error is pervasive in social interactions, and many if not most of 
these interactions do not have a fixed and known termination date. The resulting imperfect public 
monitoring has received a large amount of attention in the theoretical literature on infinitely 
repeated games (e.g., Green and Porter 1984, Radner et al. 1986, Abreu et al. 1990, Fudenberg et 
al. 1994), but only a handful of experimental studies have explored infinitely repeated games 
with errors (e.g. Aoyagi and Frechette 2009, Bigoni et al. 2012, Fudenberg et al. 2012, Aoyagi et 
al. 2013).1  
Our setup differs from that of these past studies in that we consider the effect of players 
directly observing the intended actions of their opponents, in addition to the realized ones. This 
sort of information is available in some real-world settings, for example compensation for hedge 
fund managers where both the positions taken and the actual outcomes are observable and thus 
explicit, or in a homicide when it is clear that the accused shot the victim but extenuating 
circumstances may exist – here the legal system pays attention to both intentions and outcomes, 
differentiating between manslaughter and various levels of murder.  
From a theoretical standpoint, the impact of explicitly observing intentions is clear: the 
highest equilibrium payoff can be obtained with strategies that completely ignore the realized 
outcomes and condition only on intended play, and moreover this best equilibrium is the same as 
when actions are implemented without error.  Note that this is very different from the situation in 
one-shot games, where maximizing monetary payoffs would lead subjects to ignore intentions 
entirely. Even in those games, a substantial proportion of subjects do condition on intentions in 
addition to outcomes when both pieces of information are available.2 One possible explanation 
for this apparent “preference for reciprocity” is that it reflects a heuristic that fosters cooperation 
in repeated interactions. If so, we might expect to see even more reliance on intentions in settings 
where conditioning on intentions leads to a cooperative equilibrium even in the absence of a 
                                                 
1
 Van Lange et al. (2002) studied play in a repeated continuous-choice (rather than binary) PD with errors where 
subjects were matched against computer partners playing either tit-for-tat or tit-for-two-tats (but were told that the 
partners were actual people). 
2
 Past work on intentions in one-shot games is discussed in Section 2, as well as the Bereby-Meyer and Roth (2006) 
and Kunreuther et al. (2009) studies of intentions in the finitely-repeated prisoner’s dilemma.  
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preference for reciprocity. At an empirical level, the question of how extensively people 
condition their play on intentions in infinitely repeated games remains open, as does the extent to 
which they also condition on outcomes, and the effect of all this on the level of cooperation. 
To begin to understand these issues, we study the experimental play of the repeated 
prisoner’s dilemma when intended actions are implemented with error. Our main goals are to 
understand when and in what ways subjects use data on intentions and outcomes, and how 
cooperation when intentions are revealed compares to either a setting with error when intentions 
are not observed, or one in which error is not present (so the actions themselves reveal the 
intentions). Our primary experiment presents evidence from a set of infinitely repeated prisoner’s 
dilemma games with a continuation probability of 7/8 and an error rate of 1/8. In our main 
treatments, intentions are explicit; as controls, we also consider the same games but where only 
actions are observable (thus leaving intentions implicit), as well as the same games without 
exogenously imposed error (where the observed action corresponds to the intended one). We 
explore two different payoff specifications for the stage game actions “Cooperate” (“C”) and 
“Defect” (“D”) (neutral language was used in the experiment itself). In the “high benefit” 
treatment, the benefit that playing “C” gives to the other player is high enough that there is a 
cooperative equilibrium in the game with errors whether or not intentions are observed. In the 
“low benefit” treatment, the benefit that C gives is low enough that the only equilibrium with 
errors and unobserved intentions is for both players to always defect, although cooperation 
remains an equilibrium outcome when intentions are observed.  
Summary of results 
We use two different methods to analyze the PD data: a structural estimation of the 
distribution of strategies using the “structural frequency estimation method” (SFEM) of Dal Bó 
and Frechette (2011), and a descriptive analysis that relates play in a given period of a 
supergame to the opponent’s intention and action in the period before (which implicitly assumes 
subjects use strategies that mostly depend on that information). Both methods show that most 
subjects condition almost exclusively on intentions and thus play consistently with predictions 
based on maximizing money payoffs: In our descriptive analysis, the effect of opponent’s 
intention is dramatically larger than that of the actual outcome. Similarly, in the strategy 
estimation, more than two thirds of subjects use strategies that do not condition on outcomes.  
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To the extent that subjects do condition on outcomes, interestingly, they do so in different 
ways depending on the payoff specification. In the treatment where there is less of an incentive 
to cooperate, some people (about 15%) are punitive in treating both accidental cooperation 
(partner meant to play D but played C) and accidental defection (partner meant to play C but 
played D) as defection; only when the partner both intended to play C and actually did so was 
this treated as cooperation. This behavior is not observed in the treatment with high returns to 
cooperation, where instead some people (about 19%) are tolerant in that they only retaliate 
against intentional defections – these subjects forgive both accidental defection (partner meant to 
play C but played D) as well as accidental cooperation (partner meant to played D but played C). 
Thus the “punitive” subjects in the low-benefit treatment use realized outcomes to punish 
cooperators that defect by accident, while in the high-benefit treatment “tolerant” subjects use 
the realized outcomes to forgive defectors that accidentally cooperated. 
By conditioning largely on intentions, subjects are able to achieve high levels of cooperation 
in both treatments. Compared with the controls in which intentions are implicit, explicitly 
revealing intentions lead to significantly more cooperation. Interestingly, this increase in 
cooperation is not associated with more leniency (where the subject overlooks the partner’s first 
defection) but instead with an increase in simple strategies that conditioned on at most the 
previous period. This suggests that many of the longer memory strategies seen in Fudenberg et 
al. (2012) were the result of subjects trying to infer the intentions of their opponent, either 
because doing so leads to higher monetary payoffs or because preferences depend on the 
intentions of others. 
In principle, games with errors but explicit intentions are distinct from games with no 
errors, so people might use different strategies in each. To evaluate this possibility, we compare 
play when intentions are explicit to play in games where there are no errors.3 We find that not 
only does revealing intentions increase cooperation compared to games where intentions are 
implicit, but it successfully moves cooperation levels all the way back up to the level seen in the 
absence of errors. Revealing intentions also leads subjects to use similar strategies to those 
                                                 
3
 Previous work on infinitely repeated games without errors has shown that subjects learn to cooperate, as long as 
the returns on cooperation are large enough relative to the continuation probability (Dal Bó 2005, Dreber et al. 2008, 
Dal Bó and Frechette 2011, Fudenberg et al. 2012, Rand and Nowak 2013). Furthermore, cooperation is 
significantly higher without errors compared to the case with errors where intentions are implicit (Fudenberg et al. 
2012). 
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observed in the absence of errors;  in particular in both cases most subjects condition only on 
play in previous period. 
 
2. Experimental Design and Empirical Questions 
In our experiments, the infinitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma was induced by having a 
known constant probability of  that a supergame would continue between two players 
following each period; with probability 1-δ, the supergame ended and subjects were informed 
that they have been re-matched with a new partner. In the main treatments, there was also a 
known constant error probability of E=1/8 that an intended move is changed to the opposite 
move. In this “explicit intentions” treatment, subjects were informed of the intended action of the 
other player, the other player’s realized action, and whether their own move had been changed 
(i.e. when they make an error). We also have an “implicit intentions” control, where subjects 
were told their own realized action and the realized action of the other player but not the other 
player’s intended action. Finally, we have a set of control conditions without errors on realized 
payoffs. Note that some of the control conditions (but not the explicit-observed intentions 
treatment) were reported in Fudenberg et al. (2012): we explain more on this later in the paper.  
 
Realized payoffs  Expected payoffs 
       
b/c = 1.5   b/c = 1.5, E = 1/8  
 C D   C D 
C 1,1 -2,3  C 0.875, 0.875 -1.375, 2.375 
D 3,-2 0,0  D 2.375, -1.375 0.125, 0.125 
       
b/c = 4   b/c = 4, E = 1/8  
 C D   C D 
C 6,6 -2,8  C 5.25, 5.25 -0.75, 6.75 
D 8,-2 0,0  D 6.75, -0.75 0.75, 0.75 
       
Figure 1. Payoff matrices for each condition. Payoffs are denoted in points.  
  
Subjects were informed of the specifics of their treatment (but not the existence of other 
treatments) in the experimental instructions, which are included in the Online Appendix. 
7/8δ =
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The stage game is the prisoner’s dilemma in Figure 1 where the payoffs are denoted in 
points. Cooperation and defection take the “benefit/cost” (b/c) form, where cooperation means 
paying a cost c to give a benefit b to the other player, while defection gives 0 to each party; b/c 
took the values 1.5 and 4.4 The expected payoff tables in Figure 1 incorporate the noise 
probability E=1/8. Subjects were presented with both the b/c representation and the resulting pre-
error payoff matrix, in neutral language (the choices were labeled A and B as opposed to the “C” 
and “D” that is standard in the prisoner’s dilemma).5  
As noted earlier, in the explicit-intentions treatment, the highest equilibrium payoffs can 
be supported with strategies that condition only on intentions and ignore outcomes; moreover, 
the set of such equilibria is the same as in a game with the same expected payoff matrix and 
explicit actions. Under both of the payoff specifications we used, the explicit-intentions game 
has subgame-perfect equilibria in which both players cooperate each period, including for 
example the strategy profile where both players use the “Grim” strategy, which is “Play C iff 
either player has never played D”. However, Dal Bó (2005) shows that the existence of a 
cooperative equilibrium in a repeated game without noise is not sufficient for there to be much 
cooperation, and subsequent work by Blonski et al. (2011), Dal Bó and Frechette (2011), (2013) 
and Rand and Nowak (2013) suggests that a key determinant is whether Grim risk-dominates the 
strategy “Always Defect” (ALLD) in a 2x2 game. We might suspect that a similar pattern would 
apply to games with noise and observed intentions, so we note that “Grim-I” (the grim strategy 
that conditions only on intentions and ignores outcomes) risk-dominates ALLD even in the low-
benefit treatment.6  
Turning to the game with errors and implicit intentions, we note that in the low-benefit 
treatment b/c=1.5 “both play Grim” is not a Nash equilibrium but this is an equilibrium when 
                                                 
4
 Each session used a single payoff specification. Note that the benefit/cost specification implies that the short-run 
gain to playing D instead of C is independent of the other player’s action. The prisoner’s dilemma is more general 
than this; its defining characteristics are that D is a dominant strategy and that both playing C yields the highest 
payoff - in particular both playing C should be more efficient than alternating between (C,D) and (D,C).  
5
 We use negative payoffs in order to illustrate that cooperation entails paying a cost for someone else to recieve a 
benefit, allowing us to break down C and D into costs and benefits for each player independently of what the other 
player does. 
6
 In the noisy repeated game Grim-I earns a discounted average payoff of 7/8 when facing itself. Grim-I vs ALLD 
yields -11/8 the first period, then 1/8 afterwards for discounted average of -  4/64; ALLD vs Grim-I earns 26/64; and 
ALLD vs ALLD earns 1/8. Thus facing a 50-50 mixture between the two strategies, Grim-I earns 26/64, while 
ALLD gets 17/64. 
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b/c=4.7 Consistent with this observation, the experiments reported in Fudenberg et al. (2012) 
found substantially more cooperation at b/c=4 than when b/c=1.5.  
As noted above, some of the data in our control conditions were originally reported in 
Fudenberg et al. (2012): in particular, the implicit intentions condition for both b/c=1.5 and 
b/c=4 and the no-error condition for b/c=4 were originally reported there.8 The new conditions 
for this paper are the explicit intentions conditions for both b/c=1.5 and b/c=4 and the no-error 
condition for b/c=1.5, summing up to a total of 6 new sessions with 128 participants. These 
sessions were conducted in 2013. All in all, including both the previously reported control 
conditions and these new sessions, a total of 338 subjects participated at the Harvard Decision 
Science Laboratory in Cambridge, MA. In each session, 12-32 subjects interacted anonymously 
via computer using the software z-Tree (Fischbacher 2007) in a sequence of indefinitely repeated 
prisoner’s dilemmas (see Table 1 for summary statistics on the different conditions). In total, we 
conducted a total of 16 sessions between September 2009 and December 2012. We only 
implemented one condition during a given session, so each subject participated in only one 
condition. We used the exchange rate of 30 units = $1. Subjects were given a show-up fee of 
$10 plus their winnings from the repeated prisoner’s dilemma.9 To allow for negative stage-game 
payoffs, subjects began the session with an “endowment” of 50 units (in addition to the show–up 
fee).10 On average subjects made $18 per session, with a range from $11 to $32. Sessions lasted 
approximately 60 minutes.11 
 
                                                 
7
  See the online appendix to Fudenberg et al. (2012) for equilibrium calculations of the implicit-intentions game. 
Note that there are many other cooperative equilibria in this game when b/c=4, including “perfect Tit for tat”, which 
says to play C if yesterday’s outcome was (C,C) or (D,D) and otherwise play D. 
8
 All sessions were conducted during the academic year, and all subjects were recruited through the CLER lab at 
Harvard Business School using the same recruitment procedure. In particular, the implicit intentions treatments and 
the no-error treatment for b/c=4 were originally reported in Fudenberg et al. (2012). These earlier controls used the 
more demanding “turnpike protocol” as a way to rule out contagion effects. However as the turnpike protocol 
restricts the number of supergames to one-half of the subjects in the room, our subsequent work has replaced it with 
the more common random-matching protocol. The meta-study of Dal Bó and Frechette (2015) shows that the 
turnpike does not affect cooperation rates using almost 40,000 observations across studies (the coefficient estimate 
is both very small in magnitude and not statistically significant).   
9
 Subjects also received earnings from a post-PD allocation decision that they were unaware of when playing the 
PD. 
10
 No subject finished with an endowment of fewer than 19 units, and only 2 out of 338 subjects had fewer than 50 
units. 
11
 Subjects were given at most 30 seconds to make their decision, and informed that after 30 seconds a random 
choice would be made. The frequency of random decisions was very low, only 163 out of 28,664 decisions. 
Furthermore, only 16 out of 228 subjects ever ran out of time. The largest proportion of random choices for any 
individual subject was 0.124. 
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Table 1. Summary statistics per condition and b/c. 
  b/c=1.5 b/c=4 
  
Explicit 
intentions No error 
Implicit 
intentions* 
Explicit 
intentions No error* 
Implicit 
intentions* 
Sessions per condition 2 2 3 2 3 4 
Subjects per condition 44 44 72 40 48 90 
Average number of 
supergames 9.5 9 11 9.5 8 11.3 
Average number of periods 
per supergame 8.2 8.2 8.4 8.1 8.2 8.1 
*Note that these conditions were reported in Fudenberg et al. (2012). 
 
To implement random game lengths, we followed the procedure of Dreber et al. (2008) 
and Fudenberg et al. (2012): In each session every first supergame lasted  periods, every 
second supergame lasted  etc. For comparability between the implicit and explicit intentions 
data, we used the sequence of game lengths generated in Fudenberg et al. (2012), completing as 
many games as possible within the allotted session time.12 
Past experiments on revealed intentions in games with errors have only studied one-shot 
or finitely repeated games. Bereby-Meyer and Roth (2006) explore cooperation in the one-shot 
and finitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma where actions are implemented without noise and 
payoffs are either a deterministic or stochastic function of the actions played; since the end 
period is common knowledge, there is a substantial last-period effect in each supergame (as in 
Kunreuther et al. 2009 who also explore random payoffs). They find that the outcome due to the 
random shock in the previous period matters for the decision to cooperate this period, but less so 
than whether the other player cooperated or defected in the previous period.13 Charness and 
Levine (2007), Cushman et al. (2009), Schächtele et al. (2011) and Rubin and Sheremeta 
(forthcoming) study one-shot games where intentions and outcomes can be each be either good 
or bad, can be in conflict due to a random device, and can either be rewarded or punished.14 
                                                 
12
 Note that from the viewpoint of the subjects, it was irrelevant when the game lengths were determined. The length 
of each interaction was as follows: 3 round practice; 8, 7, 10, 7, 8, 9, 5, 11, 9, 8 ,7, 8. Note that some of the 
previously collected sessions from Fudenberg et al. (2012) deviated slightly from this order; see Fudenberg et al. 
(2012) for details. 
13
 Aoyagi and Frechette (2009) and Ambrus and Greiner (2012) study repeated games with imperfect public 
monitoring; but subjects do not observe their opponents’ intended actions.  
14
 Additional work exploring the role of intentions in one-shot games is described in papers such as Blount (1995), 
Brandts and Solà (2001), Andreoni et al. (2002), Falk et al. (2003), McCabe et al. (2003) and Falk et al. (2008), 
which either compare how subjects respond to offers made by humans versus randomly generated offers (thus 
removing intentionality) or vary the strategy space of one player (thus changing the intentionality associated with a 
given outcome). In these papers intentions and outcomes are not in conflict.  
1t
2t
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While a significant fraction of subjects in these games at least partially condition on intentions, 
there is also a tendency for them to condition on outcomes. Because these settings do not have a 
cooperative equilibrium, this work offers little guidance as to the fraction of players that will 
follow the theoretically optimal policy of conditioning only on intentions in the explicit-
intentions treatment, on how the players who do respond to outcomes will do so, or on how play 
in the explicit-intentions and no-error infinitely repeated games will compare. Note that although 
conditioning only on intentions yields the highest equilibrium payoffs, a subject who believes 
that other subjects will condition on outcomes as well as intentions will find it optimal to do so 
as well, as may a subject who is uncertain whether others respond to outcomes as well as 
intentions. 
Inspired both by past experimental findings and theoretical concerns, we organize our 
analysis around the following questions: 
QUESTION 1: Does observing intentions allow more cooperative play compared to no 
intentions?  
QUESTION 2: How similar are cooperation rates in the explicit-intentions treatments compared 
to the no-error treatments?  
QUESTION 3: How close do subjects come to basing their play solely on intentions? 
QUESTION 4: To the extent that subjects condition on realized outcomes as well as intentions in 
the explicit-intentions treatment, how do they do this?  
QUESTION 5: How do the strategies used in the explicit-intentions games compare to those 
used in games with implicit intentions or no errors?  
  
9 
 
3. Results 
 
Figure 2. First period cooperation across supergames for each condition and b/c.  
 
Before addressing our main questions of interest, we investigate the extent to which behavior 
changed over the course of a session as the result of learning. Figure 2 displays measures of 
aggregate behavior in each supergame, and suggests that some learning occurred, especially in 
the no-error and explicit-intentions conditions. Examining each condition separately, we find a 
significant increase in first period cooperation over supergame number in the explicit-intentions 
treatments (b/c=1.5: p=0.010; b/c=4, p<0.001) and the no-error controls (b/c=1.5: p=0.003; 
b/c=4, p=0.034), but not in the implicit-intentions controls (b/c=1.5: p=0.788; b/c=4, p=0.166).15 
Consistent with this, a regression of all data together16 shows that learning (as measured by the 
effect of supergame number on first-period cooperation) is significantly slower in the implicit-
intentions control compared to the no-error control (p<0.001), but that learning is equally fast 
                                                 
15
 Logistic regression with robust standard errors clustered on subjects and group (i.e. subject pairing). Two-level 
clustering in all regressions follows the procedure described in Thompson (2011). See Appendix A Table A1 for full 
regression table. We note that this clustering accounts for correlation of multiple decisions from the same individual, 
as well as the correlation in decisions by the two players in a given interaction that arises from their moves later in 
the interaction being influenced by decisions that occurred earlier in interaction. Following common practice in the 
experimental literature on repeated games with re-matching, we opted to have relatively few larger sessions in each 
condition, rather than a greater number of small sessions, in order to minimize contagion effects. Because of this, 
however, we do not have enough independent sessions to cluster on session. Therefore, our regression analyses are 
limited by not being able to take into account correlation induced by learning or contagion. Nonetheless, it is 
encouraging that we see similar results in our SFEM analyses, which do not have this problem.  
16
 Logistic regression with robust standard errors clustered on subjects and group, including dummies for condition 
(no errors, implicit-intentions; explicit-intentions taken as baseline) and b/c ratio, and interacting condition dummies 
with supergame number. P-values are those associated with the condition dummy X supergame number interaction 
coefficients. We note that this regression finds significantly more cooperation at b/c=4 than b/c=1.5 (p<0.001), 
consistent with previous work (Dal Bó 2005, Dreber et al. 2008). 
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(p=0.615) in the no-error control and the explicit-intentions treatment.17 To balance the need for 
data with the evidence of learning, we focus our analysis on the last four supergames of each 
session, as in Fudenberg et al. (2012). 
To address Questions 1 and 2, we now examine the aggregate level of cooperation over 
the last four supergames, as well as the fraction of the time that subjects cooperated in the first 
period of a new supergame. 
 
 
Figure 3. First period cooperation and overall cooperation for each condition and b/c.18  
 
QUESTION 1 Does observing intentions allow more cooperative play compared to no 
intentions?  
QUESTION 2 How similar are cooperation rates in the explicit-intentions treatments compared 
to the no-error treatments?  
Figure 3 suggests that there is roughly equal cooperation in the explicit-intentions 
treatments and the no-error controls, and less cooperation in the implicit-intentions controls 
(Questions 1 and 2): for b/c=1.5, cooperation levels are 60% and 49% in the explicit-intention 
                                                 
17
 These results differ from those of Bereby-Meyer and Roth (2006), who find that learning is slower in a finitely 
repeated game with probabilistic payoffs where intentions are explicit than in one with deterministic payoffs. Their 
analysis compares first period cooperation in the first supergame with that of the last one (rather than regressing 
across all supergames). Analyzing our data in that way does not change our results qualitatively: we still find that 
learning is significantly faster in explicit-intentions than implicit-intentions (p=0.018) but that there is no significant 
difference between explicit-intentions and no error (p=0.808). We return to this difference between our results and 
those of Bereby-Meyer and Roth in the Discussion and Appendix B. 
18
 Error bars are generated by linear regression taking action (0=D, 1=C) as the dependent variable, and using robust 
standard errors clustered on subjects and group. For each set of error bars, we analyze the data from the indicated 
condition only, and show the standard error associated with the intercept in a regression with no independent 
variable. 
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treatment and the no-error control respectively, whereas it is only 32% in the implicit-intentions 
control. For b/c=4, the corresponding numbers are 75% and 78% versus 59%. Statistical tests 
confirm that there is indeed more cooperation when intentions are explicit than when they are 
implicit (significant difference at p=0.02 or less for all comparisons, except for first period 
cooperation in the cooperative b/c=4 treatment, where the differences with implicit-intentions are 
not significant, although of the same sign (vs. explicit-intentions, p=0.14; versus no error, 
p=0.294)).19 
To answer Questions 3 through 5, we turn from aggregate behavior to considering the 
particular strategies used by subjects in our experiments. As one way to do this, we use the 
SFEM of Dal Bó and Frechette (2011) to assign probability weights to a predefined set of 
strategies. We complement this method with descriptive statistics that do not require the 
specification of a particular strategy set, but instead make assumptions about the general form of 
strategies employed. 
Before addressing the remaining experimental questions in turn, we briefly describe the 
SFEM of strategy estimation and present its results. We then draw from these results to answer 
our questions. We will only summarize this method here (see Dal Bó and Frechette 2011 and 
Fudenberg et al. 2012 for more information). The idea is to restrict attention to a relatively large 
but finite set S of strategies, and suppose that each subject chooses a fixed element of S in the last 
4 supergames, and moreover that regardless of whether there are exogenous errors, subjects 
make mistakes or “mental errors” when choosing their intended action. These mistakes let us 
assign a positive likelihood to any history for player and any strategy, and we can then assign an 
aggregate likelihood to any probability distribution p on S. We estimate p by MLE, and compute 
the standard errors by bootstrap; Appendix C presents the likelihood function we use. 
 A key aspect of this approach is choosing the set of strategies S to include in the 
estimation. Given the available data it is not possible to distinguish all possible strategies, as 
some histories arise only rarely and infinitely many can never occur at all in any finite sample. 
Guided by theoretical considerations and past empirical work we begin with a set of 38 of 
                                                 
19
 Unless otherwise noted, all subsequent p-values are generated using logistic regressions taking cooperation choice 
(0=D, 1=C) as the dependent variable and a treatment dummy as the independent variable, with robust standard 
errors clustered on subjects and group. To generate the p-values reported in this paragraph, we performed pairwise 
comparisons including the data from each relevant pair of bars in Figure 3. The differences in cooperation are also 
significant when looking at the last 6 supergames instead of the last 4, and in particular there is the least cooperation 
in the implicit-intentions treatment, though the levels do change somewhat. See Appendix A Tables A2-A5 for 
regression details.  
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strategies, and then discard those that did not seem to be present in at least one payoff 
specification (including the no-error and implicit-intention controls).20 Roughly speaking, we 
start from the strategies that Dal Bó and Frechette (2011) and Fudenberg et al. (2012) found had 
a non-negligible share in at least one treatment, and add similar ones that condition on intentions 
alone or both intentions and outcomes. Appendix D lists all of the 38 original strategies and the 
procedure for discarding strategies.  
 Our final strategy set includes 17 strategies, which are described in Table 2. In addition to 
describing each strategy, Table 2 also indicates which strategies are lenient, in that they wait for 
multiple defections to punish, and which are forgiving, in that they are willing to return to 
cooperating following a breakdown in cooperation. We are particularly interested in these lenient 
strategies given their prevalence in the implicit-intentions controls, as reported in Fudenberg et 
al. (2012). 
The probability assigned to these 17 strategies by the SFEM procedure in each of our 6 
conditions is shown in Table 3.21 Only strategies that condition on outcomes are included in the 
SFEM for the no-error control (because intention and outcome are the same) and in the implicit-
intention control (because intention information was unavailable to the subjects). 
 
  
                                                 
20
 Because the game has a random termination period we do not include strategies that depend on the number of 
periods. 
21
 We note that similar strategies were estimated to be present in (i) our no-error controls and Dal Bó & Frechette’s 
(2012) no-error games (they use a modified strategy method), and in (ii) our results and the games with no error and 
with public errors of Aoyagi et al. 2013. This provides evidence of the validity of the SFEM procedure.  Note also 
that in both the observed intentions and no-errors conditions there is a fairly high rate of cooperation throughout 
every period when b/c=4; this can make it difficult to separate conditionally cooperative strategies from ALLC. For 
this reason we are not sure how to interpret the difference in the estimated shares of ALLC in these conditions.  
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Table 2. Descriptions of the 17 strategies included in the main SFEM analysis. 
Strategy Abbreviation Description 
Unconditional strategies 
  
Always Cooperate ALLC Always play C (Lenient & forgiving) 
Always Defect ALLD Always play D 
Strategies that condition on outcomes 
Tit-for-Tat TFT Play C unless partner’s action was D last period 
(Forgiving) 
Tit-for-2-Tats TF2T Play C unless partner’s action was D in both of the last 2 
periods (Lenient & forgiving) 
Tit-for-3-Tats TF3T Play C unless partner’s action was D in all of the last 3 
periods (Lenient & forgiving) 
2-Tits-for-1-Tat 2TFT Play C unless partner’s action was D in either of the last 2 
periods (2 periods of punishment if partner plays D) 
(Forgiving) 
2-Tits-for-2-Tats 2TF2T Play C unless there were 2 consecutive periods out of the 
last 3 periods in which either the partner’s action was D 
(2 periods of punishment if partner plays D twice in a 
row) (Lenient & forgiving) 
Grim Grim Play C until either player’s action is D, then play D 
forever 
Grim 2 Grim2 Play C until 2 consecutive periods occur in which either 
player’s action was D, then play D forever (Lenient) 
Grim 3 Grim3 Play C until 3 consecutive periods occur in which either 
player’s action was D, then play D forever (Lenient) 
Exploitive Tit-for-Tat D-TFT Play D in the first period, then play TFT 
Strategies that condition on intentions 
Intention based Tit-for-Tat TFT-I Play C unless partner’s intention was D last period 
(Forgiving) 
Intention based Tit-for-3-Tats TF3T-I Play C unless partner’s intention was D in all of the last 3 
periods (Lenient & forgiving) 
Intention based Grim Grim-I Play C until either player’s intention is D, then play D 
forever 
Intention based Grim 2 Grim2-I Play C until 2 consecutive periods occur in which either 
player’s intention was D, then play D forever (Lenient) 
Strategies that condition on both intentions and outcomes 
Tolerant Tit-for-Tat TFT-T Play C unless partner’s intention and action were both D 
last period (Forgiving) 
Punitive 2-Tits-for-2-Tats 2TF2T-P Play C unless there were 2 consecutive periods out of the 
last 3 periods in which either the partner’s intention or 
action was D (2 periods of punishment if partner intends or 
actually plays D twice in a row) (Lenient & forgiving) 
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Table 3. SFEM results by condition. Bootstrapped standard errors shown in parentheses. 
Difference from 0 indicated by **p<0.01, *p<0.05, †p<0.1  
  b/c=1.5 b/c=4 
  No Error 
Explicit-
Intentions 
Implicit-
Intentions No Error 
Explicit-
Intentions 
Implicit-
Intentions 
ALLC 0 0.02 0 0.24* 0.07 0.06† 
  (0) (0.03) (0) (0.1) (0.06) (0.03) 
TFT 0.27** 0 0.19** 0.14† 0 0.07* 
  (0.09) (0) (0.05) (0.07) (0) (0.03) 
TF2T 0 0.04 0.05 0 0.02 0.2** 
  (0.02) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.02) (0.07) 
TF3T 0 0 0.01 0 0 0.09† 
  (0) (0.02) (0.01) (0.04) (0.02) (0.05) 
2TFT 0 0 0.06 0.15* 0 0.03 
  (0) (0) (0.04) (0.07) (0) (0.02) 
2TF2T 0.06 0 0 0 0 0.12* 
  (0.04) (0) (0.02) (0) (0.01) (0.06) 
Grim 0.43** 0 0.14** 0.15† 0 0.04 
  (0.08) (0) (0.04) (0.08) (0) (0.02) 
Grim2 0.01 0 0.06† 0.16† 0.04 0.05† 
  (0.02) (0) (0.03) (0.08) (0.04) (0.03) 
Grim3 0 0.01 0.06† 0 0.07 0.11** 
  (0) (0.02) (0.03) (0.05) (0.06) (0.04) 
ALLD 0.18** 0.18** 0.29** 0.07† 0.10* 0.23** 
  (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) 
D-TFT 0.05 0 0.14** 0.09† 0 0 
  (0.04) (0) (0.05) (0.05) (0) (0) 
TFT-I   0.20*     0.04   
    (0.09)     (0.09)   
TF3T-I   0.07     0.16†   
    (0.05)     (0.08)   
Grim-I   0.26**     0.14†   
    (0.08)     (0.08)   
Grim2-I   0.02     0.18†   
    (0.04)     (0.09)   
TFT-T   0.04     0.19†   
    (0.04)     (0.10)   
2TF2T-P   0.15*     0   
    (0.06)     (0.02)   
Gamma 0.36** 0.31** 0.46** 0.35** 0.39** 0.43** 
  (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.04) (0.02) 
Estimated error 
rate in strategy 
implementation 
6% 4% 10% 5% 7% 9% 
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We now turn to our remaining experimental questions. 
QUESTION 3: How close do subjects come to basing their play solely on intentions? 
Examining Table 3, we see that a majority of subjects in the explicit-intentions treatments 
disregard outcomes (i.e. play unconditional strategies or strategies that condition exclusively on 
intentions): 77% of probability weight at b/c=1.5, 69% of probability weight at b/c=4. Strategies 
conditioning exclusively on outcomes account for only 4% at b/c=1.5 and 13% and b/c=4, and 
strategies that condition on both intentions and outcomes account for 19% in each payoff 
specification.  
As an additional way to examine this question, we consider all histories in which the 
opponent’s intent and actual move in the last period differed. In 82% of such cases (b/c=1.5: 
84%, b/c=4: 80%), the subject’s decision matched the opponent’s intent rather than the 
opponent’s actual move. The results are qualitatively unchanged if we exclude subjects who 
cooperated in fewer than 25% of all decisions: the subject’s decision then matched the 
opponent’s intent in the previous period in 85% of cases (b/c=1.5: 85%, b/c=4: 85%).  
 Thus both the SFEM and the descriptive statistics suggest that a large majority of subjects 
base their play solely on intentions. This contrasts with the findings in some experiments on one-
shot games, where maximizing money payoffs requires ignoring intentions entirely. Even though 
many subjects do condition at least partially on intentions in these games, there is much more of 
a tendency for them to condition on outcome as well compared to our results.22 The fact that 
intentions play a larger role in repeated games is consistent with the view that reciprocity in one-
shot games stems from the application of a heuristic that was developed for repeated interactions.  
We now focus our attention on the subset of players who do actually condition on 
outcomes to answer Question 4. 
QUESTION 4: To the extent that subjects condition on realized outcomes as well as intentions in 
the explicit-intentions treatment, how do they do this?  
                                                 
22
 For example, pooling data from the two treatments of Charness and Levine (2007), 59% of subjects (23 out of 39) 
rewarded when both intent and outcome were good, while 28.3% (15 out of 53) rewarded when intent was good but 
outcome was bad. Thus if all the subjects who rewarded after (good intent, bad outcome) would have done so after 
(good intent, good outcome), 28.3% of subjects used a purely intention-based strategy while 30.7% also conditioned 
on outcomes. The results of Cushman et al. (2009) are even more extreme, with no subjects conditioning purely on 
intentions, 36.7% conditioning purely on outcomes, and 46.7% conditioning on both intentions and outcomes.    
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 Considering the results in Table 3, we see that subjects in the two payoff specifications 
condition on outcomes differently. At b/c=1.5, a non-negligible probability weight (15%) is 
assigned to the strategy 2TF2T-P. In general, 2TF2T waits for two periods of defection by the 
partner and then punishes for two periods. The 2TF2T-P variant of 2TF2T is “punitive,” in that it 
uses outcomes to punish an accidental D, but does not use a realization of C to forgive an 
intended D. That is, these players condition on outcome when the intention was C, but not when 
the intention was D.23 At b/c=4, conversely, a non-negligible probability weight (19%) is 
assigned to the strategy TFT-T (4% of subjects at b/c=1.5 also play TFT-T). This strategy is a 
variant of TFT that is “tolerant,” in that it uses outcomes to forgive would-be defectors who 
cooperated by accident, but not to punish unintended defections. That is, in contrast to the 
punitive version of 2TF2T, this tolerant strategy conditions on outcomes when the intention was 
D, but not when the intention was C.  
To complement the SFEM analysis, we use simple descriptive measures that implicitly 
suppose that subjects ignore observations from two or more periods ago and only condition on 
observations from the previous period (Figure 4). Consistent with the MLE results, Figure 4 
suggests that at b/c=1.5 subjects are punitive and condition on outcome when the opponent’s 
intention was C, but not when the opponent’s intention was D. This visual impression is 
confirmed by a positive relationship between a player’s probability of cooperating and the 
opponent’s actual move last period when the opponent intended to play C at b/c=1.5 (p<0.001).24 
Again consistent with the SFEM, we see a different pattern at b/c=4; here, subjects are tolerant 
and condition on outcome when the opponent’s intention was D but not C. The relationship 
between cooperation and opponent’s actual move last period when the opponent intended to play 
D at b/c=4 is not statistically significant (p=0.236), although the magnitude of the difference is 
not insubstantial (36.4%C when outcome is C, 27.7%C when outcome is D).  
The tolerant strategy at b/c=4 is somewhat intuitive:  here the gains from cooperation are 
high, so subjects have an incentive to signal a willingness to cooperate when the opponent plays 
C by accident. The punitive behavior at b/c=1.5 is perhaps less expected, but we can think of two 
possible explanations. First, an inequity-averse player might punish an accidental defection even 
at the cost of potentially derailing the cooperative relationship, in order to avoid earning less than 
                                                 
23
 Charness and Levine (2007) find something similar in their one-shot experiments where some subjects only 
reward if both the intended and actual outcome are good. 
24
 See Appendix E Table E1 for regression results.  
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the opponent. This potential cost increases dramatically with the returns to cooperation, 
explaining the lower level of punitive play at b/c=4. Second, when b/c=1.5, cooperation is just 
barely risk dominant, and when a subject sees his opponent accidentally play D, she may worry 
that the opponent will switch to D thereafter, as the opponent might fear that the accident will be 
misinterpreted. We don’t see how to distinguish these hypotheses with our current data. 
 
 
Figure 4. Probability of cooperating in the last 4 supergames of the explicit-intentions 
conditions, as a function of opponent’s intention and actual move in the previous period.25 
 
A natural question that arises from these results is whether subjects learn to ignore 
outcomes over time. We do not find evidence of such learning: Interacting opponent’s actual 
move last period with supergame number finds non-significant coefficients trending in the 
positive direction, both for b/c=1.5 when opponent intended C (p=0.094; controlling for period, 
player’s intended action last period, player’s overall frequency of cooperation, and player’s 
frequency of cooperation across first periods, p=0.193) and for b/c=4 when opponent intended D 
(p=0.161; with controls, p=0.218).26  The conclusion that subjects do not learn to ignore outcome 
is reinforced by comparing an SFEM analysis on the first four supergames to that on the last 
four: fewer subjects condition on both intentions and outcomes in early supergames (b/c=1.5: 
9%, b/c=4: 4%) than in later supergames (b/c=1.5: 19%; b/c=4: 19%). Thus there is no evidence 
                                                 
25
 Error bars indicate standard errors of the mean clustered on subject and pairing, as in Figure 3. Average behavior 
over all subjects is shown. 
26
 We find qualitatively equivalent results when, instead of assuming that learning is linear in supergame number, 
we compare play in the first four supergames with play in the last four. (Interacting a “last 4 supergames” dummy 
with opponent’s actual move finds a non-significant positive coefficient in all cases; b/c=1/5, opponent intended C: 
p=0.13 without controls, p=0.33 with controls; b/c=4, opponent intended D: p=0.174 without controls, p=0.160 with 
controls). 
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that reliance on outcomes decreases with experience; if anything, it seems that reliance on 
outcomes may increase over time. See Appendix E for full regression tables and first four 
supergame SFEM results. 
QUESTION 5: How do the strategies used in the explicit intentions games compare to those used 
in games with implicit intentions or no errors?  
In addition to asking whether and how subjects used realized outcomes in addition to 
intentions to guide their play, we are interested in how various strategic features of play with 
explicit intentions compare to those in the no-error and implicit-intentions controls. Specifically, 
we compare the memory length of the strategies used in the three conditions, and the extent to 
which play is “lenient” in the sense of not punishing the first deviation by an opponent. 
Intuitively, the high share of lenient strategies observed in the implicit-intentions controls may 
correspond to subjects giving their partner the benefit of the doubt that a defection could have 
occurred by accident, and to combine this sort of leniency with punishment for persistent 
defections requires strategies to look back more than one period.27 Thus we might expect less 
leniency and more simple strategies in the explicit-intentions conditions compared to the 
implicit-intentions conditions. 
 Table 4 shows the relevant aggregated SFEM frequencies, as well as various descriptive 
statistics. First we consider the SFEM aggregations. In terms of strategy complexity, we see that 
the explicit-intentions treatments look very similar to the no-error controls: a large majority of 
cooperative strategies are simple in that they are either unconditional or condition/trigger based 
on the previous period only (b/c=1.5: 74% explicit-intentions, 75% no error; b/c=4, 81% 
explicit-intentions, 77% no error). This stands in stark contrast to the implicit-intentions controls, 
where the frequency of simple strategies is cut nearly in half (43% at both b/c=1.5 and b/c=4).  
Next we consider leniency. We know from Fudenberg et al. (2012) that when intentions 
are implicit, leniency is common (and very successful) at b/c ratios where cooperative equilibria 
exist (such as b/c=4), but relatively rare at the low b/c ratio of 1.5 where there are no cooperative 
equilibria. If leniency reflects an attempt to infer the intentions of one’s partner, we would expect 
                                                 
27
 Fudenberg et al. (2012) also considers the strategic element of ‘forgiveness,’ or willingness to return to cooperate 
after punishing a defection. Unlike leniency, there is not a clear a priori prediction about the effect of observing 
intentions on forgiveness. Thus we do not analyze forgiveness here, but include it in the Appendix F for 
completeness, where we show that there is not a clear relationship between it and whether intentions are observable. 
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less leniency at b/c=4 when intentions are explicit than when they are implicit. Consistent with 
that expectation, at b/c=4, the fraction of cooperative strategies that are lenient in the explicit-
intentions condition is much more similar to the no-error control than the implicit-intentions 
control. When b/c=1.5, it is not clear what to expect, because revealing intentions creates 
cooperative equilibria where none existed with implicit intentions: while there is less need to 
infer intentions when intentions are explicit, it is also much less costly to be lenient (since most 
others are cooperative). We find that when b/c=1.5, leniency in the explicit-intentions treatment 
is similar to the implicit-intentions control (and actually slightly higher), and both are higher than 
the no-error control.28  
We now complement these results with descriptive statistics. For maximum 
comparability, these measures use intentions in the explicit-intentions treatments, and outcomes 
in the implicit-intentions and no-error controls. In each case, we measure leniency by examining 
all histories in which C (either intentional or realized, depending on the measure) occurred in all 
but the previous period, while in the previous period one subject played D.29 We then ask how 
frequently the subject who had hitherto cooperated showed leniency by continuing to cooperate. 
The results are similar to the SFEM. At b/c=4, leniency in the explicit-intentions condition is 
lower than the implicit-intentions control, whereas at b/c=1.5, the amount of leniency is similar 
in explicit-intentions and implicit-intentions.  
In sum, we find evidence that in the presence of errors, making intentions explicit 
increases the frequency of cooperative strategies, reduces the complexity of those cooperative 
strategies, and also reduces the extent of leniency (at least at b/c=4, the specification in which 
leniency is common when intentions are implicit). 
  
                                                 
28
 As the fraction of cooperative strategies varies across condition (in particular, at b/c=1.5 the implicit-intention 
condition is much lower than the other conditions), we report the fraction of cooperative strategies that are lenient, 
rather than the fraction of all strategies that are lenient. For completeness, we report the un-normalized values here: 
b/c-1.5: no-error=7%, explicit-intentions=31%, implicit-intentions=17%; b/c=4: no-error=40%, explicit-
intentions=53%, implicit-intentions=63%.  
29
 We also include second round decisions in which the first round’s outcome was CD. 
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Table 4. Aggregated SFEM frequencies and descriptive results by condition. 
  b/c=1.5 b/c=4 
  No error 
Explicit 
intentions 
Implicit 
intentions No error 
Explicit 
intentions 
Implicit 
intentions 
Cooperative strategies in SFEM  77% 82% 56% 84% 90% 77% 
% of Cooperative strategies in SFEM that are: 
Memory at most 1 75% 74% 43% 77% 81% 43% 
Lenient 9% 38% 31% 47% 59% 81% 
              
Descriptive statistics 
%C first period 73% 75% 54% 83% 86% 76% 
%C all periods 49% 60% 32% 78% 75% 59% 
Leniency 15% 28% 29% 42% 55% 66% 
 
4. Discussion 
We begin by asking how well subjects did in terms of maximizing their payoffs, both overall 
and by type of strategy used. This provides some insight into which sorts of strategies were (ex 
post) mistakes, and gives us a rough sense of how close the distribution of play is to an 
equilibrium - e.g. what percentage of players are receiving close to the best possible payoff given 
the distribution of play.  
Table 5 shows the expected payoff of each strategy given the distribution estimated by the 
SFEM.30 In the explicit-intentions treatment at b/c=1.5, the two most prevalent strategies are 
TFT-I and Grim2-I; these purely intention-based strategies also yield the highest payoff of 5.5. 
The payoff of the punitive 2TF2T-P, which was also somewhat common, was slightly lower, but 
this difference is not statistically significant. 
 
  
                                                 
30
 This analysis assumes that the SFEM accurately identified the frequency of each strategy. To partially address 
potential errors in the SFEM identification, we bootstrap standard errors for each expected payoff by repeatedly 
sampling with replacement from player histories, and then recalculating the SFEM and resulting expected payoff for 
each strategy. 
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Table 5. SFEM frequency and expected payoffs for each strategy in each condition. Highest 
payoff strategies, and strategies with payoffs that are not statistically different from the highest 
payoff (based on bootstrapped standard errors using a significance level of p<0.1), are 
highlighted in gray. 
  b/c=1.5 b/c=4 
  No Error 
Explicit 
Intentions 
Implicit 
intentions No error 
Explicit 
Intentions 
Implicit 
intentions 
  MLE Payoff MLE Payoff MLE Payoff MLE Payoff MLE Payoff MLE Payoff 
ALLC   3.5 0.02 3.6   -1.3 0.24 43.0 0.07 36.5 0.06 28.1 
TFT 0.27 5.9   4.6 0.19 2.4 0.14 42.3   33.6 0.07 29.0 
TF2T   5.7 0.04 4.8 0.05 1.5   43.9 0.02 36.7 0.20 29.6 
TF3T   5.5   4.6 0.01 0.9   43.8   37.0 0.09 29.5 
2TFT   5.8   4.7 0.06 2.9 0.15 40.8   30.3 0.03 27.0 
2TF2T 0.06 5.7   4.9   1.9   43.9   36.3 0.12 29.6 
Grim 0.43 5.8   4.4 0.14 3.0 0.15 40.8   25.9 0.04 24.0 
Grim2 0.01 5.7   4.8 0.06 2.4 0.16 43.9 0.04 33.5 0.05 27.9 
Grim-3   5.5 0.01 4.9 0.06 1.8   43.8 0.07 36.4 0.11 29.2 
ALLD 0.18 2.5 0.18 4.1 0.29 3.7 0.07 21.1 0.10 19.1 0.23 21.0 
D-TFT 0.05 2.7   4.1 0.15 2.9 0.09 25.4   29.8   28.7 
TFT-I     0.20 5.5         0.04 37.7     
TF3T-I     0.07 5.1         0.16 37.4     
Grim-I     0.26 5.5         0.14 37.6     
Grim2-I     0.02 5.3         0.18 37.5     
TFT-T     0.04 5.3         0.19 37.5     
2TF2T-P     0.15 5.2           36.5     
 
The most common poorly performing strategy here is ALLD. The payoff loss to ALLD is even 
higher in the no-error control, due to the smaller share of lenient strategies and the increased 
share of the unforgiving strategy set Grim and its variants. Conversely, ALLD yields the highest 
payoff in the implicit-intentions control, where it is also the most commonly used strategy. 
Mistaken extrapolation from that case could help explain the play of ALLD in the explicit-
intentions and no-error treatments.  
At b/c=4, in the explicit-intentions treatment most subjects play some sort of conditional 
cooperation strategy based on intentions only or intentions and outcomes; all of these strategies 
do fairly well, earning payoffs not statistically different from the highest performing strategy. In 
particular the expected payoff of the tolerant strategy TFT-T is statistically indistinguishable 
from that of TFT-I. Once again, the most common “mistake” is to play ALLD, which yields a 
payoff of about 19 versus the high-30’s payoffs obtained with conditional cooperation. Thus in 
22 
 
both payoff treatments, a high fraction of the subjects do quite well, and subjects who condition 
on outcomes as well as intentions do so at essentially no cost.  
As shown above in Figure 2, learning is significantly slower in the implicit-intentions 
control compared to the no-error control, but that learning is equally fast in the no-error control 
and the explicit-intentions treatment. This latter fact contrasts with the finding of Bereby-Meyer 
and Roth (2006), who found that adding a stochastic shock to payoffs (as opposed to actions) 
resulted in slower learning. One possible explanation is that our procedure speeds learning 
because it focuses attention on the opponent’s intentions, which are what subjects need to be 
learning about in order to reach the best equilibrium.31 This focus on intentions might be due 
either to the fact that implementation errors alter both players’ payoffs in our case while the 
lotteries in Bereby-Meyer and Roth were independent, or because the framing of our game 
suggests to subjects that intentions are what matters.  
To directly test this latter possibility, we ran a follow-up experiment on Amazon 
Mechanical Turk (Horton et al. 2011), recruiting 96 subjects and randomizing them into one of 
two ways to explain the structure of the random errors, the “Error” and “Lottery” conditions, 
where we asked subjects about the intentionality of a D outcome when C was chosen. In the 
Error condition, the probabilistic mechanism was explained with the same language as in our 
explicit-intentions condition. In the Lottery condition, the probabilistic mechanism was instead 
explained by saying that there were two options as in the Bereby-Meyer and Roth study.32  
As predicted, subjects in the Error condition thought that the D outcome was significantly 
less intentional than subjects in the Lottery condition did (mean intentionality ratings on 1-7 
scale: Error: 2.27, Lottery: 3.33; Rank-sum, p=0.036; Tobit regression with robust standard 
errors: p=0.020; including controls for age, gender and education: p=0.009). This result supports 
our hypothesis that framing noise as execution errors emphasizes the ‘accidental’ nature of bad 
outcomes relative to framing noise as a lottery, and so increases the subjects’ attention to the 
intentions of their partner. Put differently, the execution-error framing may decrease subjects’ 
                                                 
31
 Another possibility is that the difference in expected payoffs between cooperative and non-cooperative strategies 
may have been smaller in Bereby-Meyer and Roth’s experiments than in our explicit-intentions conditions, thus 
providing a weaker signal for learning. To evaluate this possibility, one could use SFEM to estimate the distribution 
of strategies in Bereby-Meyer and Roth’s data and then calculate the expected payoffs of each strategy. However, 
given that they used fixed length games, it is not clear to us which strategies should be included in the SFEM (e.g. 
strategies which open with cooperation but then switch to defection after some number of periods) so we do not 
explore this possibility here.  
32
 See the Online Appendix for the full instructions. 
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sense of ‘causal control’ (Cushman et al. 2009) relative to the lottery framing, in that the error 
frame makes it seem as though some other agent (the computer) is causing the bad outcome, 
rather than the player.33 We conjecture that this increased the subjects’ ability to focus on the 
intended good outcome and that this is why learning proceeded more quickly.  
 We also see that subjects use simpler, lower-memory strategies with explicit intentions 
than when intentions are implicit. This suggests that the more complex strategies found in the 
implicit-intentions conditions (reported in Fudenberg et al. 2012) use longer memory in part as a 
way to attempt to learn and track the intentions of other subjects. This is particularly true for 
b/c=4, where there is a high return to cooperation, and long memory lenient cooperative 
strategies were most prevalent with implicit intentions. 
To further investigate strategic complexity, we examine how response times vary with 
play and condition.34 We see that faster decisions are more cooperative (p<0.001).35 Considering 
variation by condition, we would predict based on the complexity of the decision setting that 
decision times should be fastest in the no-error control, slowest in the implicit-intentions control, 
and intermediate with explicit intentions. When we examine the data, we see that the decision 
times conform to this prediction when b/c=4.36 However, when b/c=1.5, decision time is longest 
in the explicit-intentions treatment, with the no-error treatment coming second.37  
We also see interesting differences across conditions in learning: In the no-error and 
explicit-intentions conditions, decision times decrease with experience as measured by 
supergame number on (p<0.001 for both), as we would expect; but with implicit intentions, 
                                                 
33
 See also Bolton et al. (2005) who explore procedural fairness versus outcome fairness. 
34
 The only paper we are aware of that considers the correlation between response times and cooperation in repeated 
PDs with noise is Rand et al. (2012), who re-analyze the data of Fudenberg et al. (2012) and find a positive 
correlation. 
35
 Logistic regression with robust standard errors clustered on subject and pairing, considering the last four 
supergames. Log-10 transformed response time is taken as the independent variable, and controls for condition 
(dummies for explicit-intention, no-error or implicit-intention), b/c, supergame number and period number are 
included. Decision times are log-10 transformed as in Rand et al. (2012) to account for the heavily skewed nature of 
the response time distributions. Equivalent results are found when using untransformed response times, when 
including all supergames, or both. See Online Appendix A Table OA1. 
36
 Log-10 transformed response times: no-error, 0.144; explicit-intentions, 0.185; implicit-intentions, 0.263. An 
equivalent ordering is obtained when controlling for supergame, period, and whether the decision was C or D. 
37
 Log-10 transformed response times: no-error, 0.294; explicit-intentions, 0.224; implicit-intentions, 0.235. An 
equivalent ordering is obtained when controlling for supergame period, and whether the decision was C or D, except 
that the very similar response times of explicit-intentions and implicit-intentions flip. 
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decision times actually increase (p<0.001).38 Further investigation of this increasing response 
time in the implicit-intentions condition finds a significant negative interaction between 
supergame number and subjects’ overall frequency of cooperation when predicting response time 
(p<0.001; controlling for the period 1 intention of the partner in the previous supergame and 
current partner’s action in the previous period, p=0.001)39: the less often a subject cooperated 
overall, the more her response time tended to increase with experience (controlling for whether 
the current decision was C or D). As a result, regressing decision time against supergame number 
finds no significant relationship when only examining subjects who were largely cooperative (i.e. 
cooperated in more than 2/3 of all decisions, p=0.890).40 This increase in reaction times by non-
cooperative subjects may reflect the effects of learning: these subjects are generally inclined to 
defect, but over time gather evidence that cooperation might be in their interest. This makes 
cooperation somewhat more attractive, moving the expected utility of cooperation and defection 
closer together, and as a result faces these subjects with a more difficult and time consuming 
choice (in contrast to the initially cooperative subjects, whose inclination is reinforced by 
experience). Such decision conflict can increase decision times (Evans et al. 2015). 
Although we do not have a theoretical explanation for all of the response time data, we 
believe that the connection between response time and choice of strategy, and how this varies 
with the strategic environment, is an interesting topic that merits future study. 
 
Conclusion 
 We conclude that making intentions explicit allows subjects to achieve the same level of 
cooperation under errors as if errors were not present, because subjects largely ignore outcomes 
                                                 
38
 Linear regressions with robust standard errors clustered on subject and pairing, taking log10(response time) as the 
DV, supergame as the IV, and including controls for b/c, period and whether the decision was C or D. See Online 
Appendix A Table OA2.. 
39
 Linear regression with robust standard errors clustered on subject and pairing, considering the implicit-intentions 
condition, taking log10(response time) as the DV, supergame  number and frequency of cooperation over all 
decisions as the IVs, and including an interaction between these two terms as well as controls for b/c, period and 
whether the decision was C or D. 
40
 The cutoff of 2/3 was determined by testing at which frequency of overall cooperation the net coefficient on 
supergame number became non-significant. P-value reflects linear regression with robust standard errors clustered 
on subject and pairing, considering the implicit-intentions condition, taking log10(response time) as the DV, 
supergame number and frequency of cooperation over all decisions as the IVs, and controls for b/c, period and 
whether the decision was C or D. The finding of no effect among these subjects persists when also controlling for 
the period 1 intention of the partner in the previous supergame and current partner’s action in the previous period 
(p=0.192). 
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and condition only on intentions. This finding is consistent with the predictions of theory in the 
sense that the highest payoff equilibrium ignores outcomes. Moreover, intention-based strategies 
are both common and earn high payoffs given the observed distribution of play. Thus institutions 
that increase the observability of intentions may help to mitigate the negative consequences of 
errors: when your aim is true, accidents will by and large be forgiven and forgotten.  
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Appendix A: 
Table A1. First period cooperation by supergame. Logistic regression with robust standard errors 
clustered on subject and pairing. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 Explicit-intentions No-error Implicit-intentions All data 
 b/c=1.5 b/c=4 b/c=1.5 b/c=4 b/c=1.5 b/c=4  
                
Supergame 0.118*** 0.189*** 0.118*** 0.129** 0.00583 0.0336 0.123*** 
 (0.0456) (0.0262) (0.0396) (0.0607) (0.0217) (0.0243) (0.0332) 
Explicit       0.0307 
       (0.305) 
Implicit       0.0260 
       (0.263) 
Explicit X 
Supergame       0.0230 
       (0.0458) 
Implicit X 
Supergame       -0.101*** 
       (0.0369) 
b/c       0.318*** 
       (0.0834) 
Constant 0.214 0.658* 0.0841 0.780*** 0.152 0.793*** -0.439 
 (0.269) (0.344) (0.298) (0.300) (0.218) (0.226) (0.310) 
        
Observations 416 392 396 396 810 1,072 3,482 
Subject-clusters 44 40 44 48 72 90 338 
Pairing-clusters 208 196 198 198 405 536 1,741 
Standard errors in parentheses       
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1       
 
Table A2. Mean comparisons, overall C, comparing no-error with explicit intentions (columns 1-
2), comparing implicit intentions with explicit intentions (columns 3-4), comparing implicit 
intentions with no-error (columns 5-6), for last 4 interactions. Logistic regression with robust 
standard errors clustered on subject and pairing. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Comparison: Explicit Comparison: Explicit Comparison: No error 
 b/c=1.5 b/c=4 b/c=1.5 b/c=4 b/c=1.5 b/c=4 
          
  
No error -0.444 0.158     
 (0.316) (0.375)     
Implicit   -1.167*** -0.735** -0.722*** -0.893*** 
   (0.288) (0.317) (0.245) (0.303) 
Constant 0.415* 1.083*** 0.415* 1.083*** -0.0294 1.241*** 
 (0.247) (0.273) (0.247) (0.273) (0.196) (0.257) 
       
Observations 2,972 3,000 4,032 4,444 4,052 4,708 
Standard errors in parentheses     
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1     
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Table A3. Mean comparisons, first round C, comparing no-error with explicit intentions 
(columns 1-2), comparing implicit intentions with explicit intentions (columns 3-4), comparing 
implicit intentions with no-error (columns 5-6), for last 4 interactions. Logistic regression with 
robust standard errors clustered on subject and pairing. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Comparison: Explicit Comparison: Explicit Comparison: No error 
 b/c=1.5 b/c=4 b/c=1.5 b/c=4 b/c=1.5 b/c=4 
          
  
No error -0.0889 -0.264     
 (0.441) (0.550)     
Implicit   -0.946** -0.708 -0.857** -0.444 
   (0.392) (0.480) (0.356) (0.423) 
Constant 1.099*** 1.836*** 1.099*** 1.836*** 1.010*** 1.572*** 
 (0.333) (0.420) (0.332) (0.420) (0.289) (0.354) 
       
Observations 352 352 464 520 464 552 
Standard errors in parentheses     
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1     
 
Table A4. Mean comparisons, overall C, comparing no-error with explicit intentions (columns 1-
2), comparing implicit intentions with explicit intentions (columns 3-4), comparing implicit 
intentions with no-error (columns 5-6), for last 6 interactions. Logistic regression with robust 
standard errors clustered on subject and pairing. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Comparison: Explicit Comparison: Explicit Comparison: No error 
 b/c=1.5 b/c=4 b/c=1.5 b/c=4 b/c=1.5 b/c=4 
          
  
No error -0.414 0.132     
 (0.294) (0.338)     
Implicit   -1.202*** -0.712** -0.788*** -0.844*** 
   (0.264) (0.285) (0.231) (0.274) 
Constant 0.462** 1.024*** 0.462** 1.024*** 0.0482 1.156*** 
 (0.227) (0.246) (0.227) (0.245) (0.187) (0.232) 
       
Observations 4,332 4,328 6,046 6,512 6,026 6,888 
Standard errors in parentheses     
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1     
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Table A5. Mean comparisons, first round C, comparing no-error with explicit intentions 
(columns 1-2), comparing implicit intentions with explicit intentions (columns 3-4), comparing 
implicit intentions with no-error (columns 5-6), for last 6 interactions. Logistic regression with 
robust standard errors clustered on subject and pairing. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Comparison: Explicit Comparison: Explicit Comparison: No error 
 b/c=1.5 b/c=4 b/c=1.5 b/c=4 b/c=1.5 b/c=4 
          
  
No error -0.206 -0.324     
 (0.419) (0.499)     
Implicit   -0.872** -0.649 -0.666* -0.325 
   (0.377) (0.450) (0.345) (0.386) 
Constant 1.039*** 1.768*** 1.039*** 1.768*** 0.833*** 1.444*** 
 (0.315) (0.388) (0.315) (0.388) (0.276) (0.312) 
       
Observations 528 528 696 780 696 828 
Standard errors in parentheses     
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1     
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Appendix B: Re-analysis of learning in Bereby-Meyer and Roth (2006) 
Bereby-Meyer and Roth (2006) (BMR) compare learning rates in finitely repeated games where 
payoffs are either deterministic or probabilistic.41 They have also include a ‘sun-spots’ control in 
which payoffs are deterministic, but players are also presented with the outcome of two random 
lotteries (that do not effect payoffs) each turn. They conclude that learning to cooperate in period 
1 occurs more slowly in the probabilistic condition than in either the deterministic or sun-spot 
conditions. As the main text explains, they used a different analysis strategy. Instead of 
regressing first period cooperation against supergame number, BMR compared just the first and 
the last supergame. This difference in methods did not change the analysis of our data.  
 Now, we re-analyze their data using our learning metric: comparing the coefficient for 
supergame number when predicting first period cooperation across conditions.42 Doing so, we 
also find that there is significantly slower learning when payoffs are probabilistic compared to 
deterministic in a repeated game (condition X supergame: coeff = 0.120, p<0.001), but we do not 
find a significant difference in learning speed between their probabilistic condition and their sun-
spot control (coeff = 0.032, p=0.224). As can be seen in Figure B1, cooperation in the sun-spot 
control climbs rapidly in supergames 2 and 3, but then stabilizes.  
 
Figure B1. Cooperation in period 1 of the finitely repeated games from Bereby-Meyer and Roth 
(2006). 
                                                 
41
 They also study one-shot games. 
42
 As in the main text, we use logistic regression with standard errors clustered on subject and group. 
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If we restrict our re-analysis to supergames 1 and 20 (as in their original analysis), we 
replicate their result: significantly more change from supergame 1 to 20 in both the deterministic 
(p=0.006) and the sun-spot (p=0.005) conditions compared to the probabilistic condition. These 
two methods of analysis give different results in the sun-spots condition because most of the 
learning there occurs in the first three supergames; regressing over all supergames shows 
relatively little change in first period cooperation per supergame, despite that fact that first period 
cooperation increases substantially from the first supergame to the last. 
Overall, it seems that the noise in BMR had a substantially different effect on learning 
than the shocks to actions in our experiments. One possible explanation is that the noise in their 
probabilistic condition psychologically feels different from how we introduce noise.43. Although 
these two processes are mathematically equivalent, our procedure places more emphasis on the 
role of intentions: it makes it feel like the other person didn’t mean to choose the outcome in 
cases were errors occur. In BMR’s setup, although the players do not have direct control over the 
outcomes, it may not feel to the opponent that the randomness of lottery is changing the actor’s 
intent. As discussed in the main text, we explore this possibility with an additional experiment. 
 
  
                                                 
43
 Recall that in their probabilistic condition, players select between two lotteries, and then an outcome is drawn 
from the chosen lottery. In our explicit-intention conditions, players choose a fixed outcome, and the computer then 
switches their choice to the opposite with some probability. 
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Appendix C: Details of the Structural Frequency Estimation Method (SFEM)  
 We use the SFEM introduced by Dal Bo & Frechette (2011) and used in Fudenberg et al. 
(2012). We suppose that if subject i uses strategy s, her chosen action in round r of supergame k 
is C if ( ) 0ikr ikrs s + ≥γε , where ( ) 1ikrs s = if strategy s says to play C in round r of supergame k 
given the history to that point, and ( ) 1ikrs s =−  if s says to play D. Here ikrε  is an error term 
that is independent across subjects, rounds, supergames, and histories, γ  parameterizes the 
probability of mistakes, and the density of the error term is such that the overall likelihood that 
subject i uses strategy s is 
(1) γ γ
1
1 1
( )
1 exp( ( ) / ) 1 exp( ( ) / )
ikr ikr
y y
i k r
ikr ikr
p s
s s s s
−       = Π Π      + − +   
, 
where ikry  is 1 if the subject chose C and 0 if the subject chose D. 44 
For any given set of strategies S and proportions p¸ we then derive the likelihood for the entire 
sample as a mixture model, namely ( )ln ( ) ( )iI s S p s p s∈∑ ∑ . Note that the specification assumes 
that all subjects are ex-ante identical with the same probability distribution over strategies and 
the same distribution over errors; one could relax this at the cost of adding more parameters. 
Because p describes a distribution over strategies, this likelihood function implies that in a very 
large sample we expect fraction p(s) of subjects to use strategy s, though for finite samples there 
will be a non-zero variance in the population shares. We use maximum likelihood estimation 
(MLE) to estimate the prevalence of the various strategies, and bootstrapping to associate 
standard errors with each of our frequency estimates. We construct 100 bootstrap samples for 
each treatment by randomly sampling the appropriate number of subjects with replacement. We 
then determine the standard deviation of the MLE estimates for each strategy frequency across 
the 100 bootstrap samples. The validity of this procedure was demonstrated using simulated data 
in Fudenberg et al 2012.  
                                                 
44
 Thus the probability of an error in implementing one’s strategy is 1/(1+exp(1/γ)). Note that this represents error in 
intention, rather than the experimentally imposed error in execution. This formulation assumes that all strategies 
have an equal rate of implementation error. In Fudenberg et al. (2012) we show that the MLE estimates of strategy 
shares are robust to allowing each strategy have a different value of γ. 
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Appendix D: SFEM including all intent-outcome hybrids  
(only the explicit-intentions conditions) 
  b/c=1.5 b/c=4    b/c=1.5 b/c=4 
ALLC 0.02 0.07  TFTI CC 0.01 0 
  (0.03) (0.06)    (0.02) (0) 
TFT 0 0  TF2TI CC 0 0.03 
  (0) (0)    (0.03) (0.04) 
TF2T 0 0  TF3TI CC 0.08 0 
  (0.01) (0)    (0.06) (0.02) 
TF3T 0 0  2TFTI CC 0 0 
  (0) (0)    (0) (0) 
2TFT 0 0  2TF2TI CC 0.08 0 
  (0) (0)    (0.06) (0.01) 
2TF2T 0 0  GI CC 0 0 
  (0) (0)    (0) (0) 
G 0 0  G2I CC 0 0 
  (0) (0)    (0) (0) 
G2 0 0.04  G3I CC 0 0 
  (0) (0.04)    (0) (0.04) 
G3 0 0.07  D-TFTI CC 0 0 
  (0) (0.06)    (0) (0) 
ALLD 0.18** 0.1*  TFTI DD 0 0.18† 
  (0.06) (0.05)    (0.04) (0.1) 
DTFT 0 0  TF2TI DD 0.06 0 
  (0) (0)    (0.05) (0.01) 
TFTI 0.19* 0.03  TF3TI DD 0 0 
  (0.09) (0.09)    (0) (0.05) 
TF2TI 0.02 0  2TFTI DD 0 0 
  (0.04) (0.02)    (0) (0) 
TF3TI 0 0.16†  2TF2TI DD 0 0 
  (0.03) (0.09)    (0.01) (0.02) 
2TFTI 0.09 0  GI DD 0 0 
  (0.07) (0.01)    (0) (0) 
2TF2TI 0 0  G2I DD 0 0.01 
  (0.04) (0)    (0.04) (0.09) 
GI 0.24** 0.15†  G3I DD 0 0 
  (0.08) (0.09)    (0) (0.01) 
G2I 0 0.17  D-TFTI DD 0 0 
  (0.01) (0.11)    (0) (0) 
G3I 0 0  Gamma 0.3** 0.39** 
  (0.01) (0.01)    (0.02) (0.04) 
D-TFTI 0.02 0     
  (0.03) (0)     
 
This table shows the results of a first MLE with all 38 possible strategies. Next we performed a 
second estimation including only strategies that had weight great than 0.05 in at least one 
condition. For our final MLE shown in the main text, we then included only the strategies that 
were present at p<0.10 in at least one condition in the second MLE.   
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Appendix E – Change in conditioning on outcomes over period 
 
Table E1. Cooperation in explicit intentions condition as a function of opponent’s actual move 
(e.g. outcome) in the previous period. Logistic regression with robust standard errors clustered 
on subject and pairing. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
  b/c=1.5, Opponent intended C last period b/c=4, Opponent intended D last period 
  
Last 4 supergames All supergames Last 4 supergames All supergames 
            
Opponent's Outcome 1.104*** 1.666*** -0.0156 0.0786 0.399 0.366 -0.493 -0.456 
  (0.289) (0.556) (0.474) (1.186) (0.337) (0.433) (0.520) (0.492) 
Supergame Number 
 -0.0882 0.0667 -0.0942  0.0584 0.00376 0.0484 
  
 (0.165) (0.0823) (0.142)  (0.0942) (0.0406) (0.0312) 
Period 
 -0.124  -0.131**  -0.211***  -0.0999* 
  
 (0.100)  (0.0591)  (0.0788)  (0.0515) 
Player's intended C last period 
 3.915***  4.003***  1.237***  1.253*** 
   (0.466)  (0.467)  (0.464)  (0.269) 
Your overall C  6.013***  8.702***  3.326***  3.648*** 
   (1.010)  (1.147)  (0.781)  (1.135) 
Your first period C  -1.209  -2.579***  -1.229***  -1.750** 
   (0.837)  (0.837)  (0.428)  (0.806) 
Opponent's Outcome X 
Supergame Number   0.148* 0.227   0.132 0.118 
    (0.0883) (0.174)   (0.0942) (0.0958) 
Constant 1.283*** -3.136* 0.957* -3.475*** -0.959*** -1.606* -0.956*** -2.175*** 
  (0.328) (1.672) (0.516) (0.968) (0.267) (0.905) (0.310) (0.596) 
            
Observations 795 795 1,708 1,708 293 293 761 761 
Standard errors in parentheses        
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1             
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Table E2. SFEM analyzing first four supergames.  
  b/c=1.5 b/c=4 
  No Error 
Explicit 
Intentions 
Implicit 
Intentions No Error 
Explicit 
Intentions 
Implicit 
Intentions 
ALLC 0 0 0.01 0.11† 0.06 0.06† 
  (0) (0) (0.01) (0.06) (0.05) (0.03) 
TFT 0.19* 0.03 0.12* 0.38** 0 0.1** 
  (0.09) (0.03) (0.05) (0.09) (0) (0.04) 
TF2T 0.08† 0 0.05 0.13 0 0.16** 
  (0.05) (0.01) (0.04) (0.09) (0) (0.06) 
TF3T 0 0.03 0.01 0 0 0.05 
  (0) (0.03) (0.01) (0) (0.02) (0.04) 
2TFT 0.04 0 0.11* 0 0 0.03 
  (0.05) (0) (0.05) (0) (0) (0.03) 
2TF2T 0 0 0.11* 0 0 0.15** 
  (0.02) (0) (0.05) (0.03) (0.01) (0.06) 
Grim 0.22** 0 0.07* 0.14* 0 0 
  (0.08) (0) (0.03) (0.07) (0) (0.01) 
Grim2 0.06 0 0.02 0.06 0 0.11** 
  (0.04) (0) (0.02) (0.06) (0.02) (0.04) 
Grim3 0.02 0 0.04 0 0.11 0.07† 
  (0.03) (0) (0.03) (0.04) (0.07) (0.04) 
ALLD 0.20** 0.25** 0.40** 0.09* 0.13* 0.23** 
  (0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) 
D-TFT 0.18** 0.06 0.05 0.09* 0.02 0.03 
  (0.06) (0.04) (0.03) (0.05) (0.03) (0.02) 
TFT-I   0.29**     0.34**   
    (0.1)     (0.11)   
TF3T-I   0.06     0   
    (0.04)     (0)   
Grim-I   0.18**     0.19†   
    (0.07)     (0.1)   
Grim2-I   0.03     0.11   
    (0.03)     (0.08)   
TFT-T   0.05     0.04   
    (0.04)     (0.05)   
2TF2T-P   0.04     0   
    (0.05)     (0.04)   
Gamma 0.43** 0.43** 0.57** 0.37** 0.51** 0.51** 
  (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.06) (0.03) 
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Appendix F: Forgiveness across conditions 
  b/c=1.5 b/c=4 
  No error 
Explicit 
intentions 
Implicit 
intentions No error 
Explicit 
intentions 
Implicit 
intentions 
% Cooperative strategies  
in SFEM that are forgiving 43% 65% 55% 63% 52% 73% 
Descriptive statistics 5% 6% 13% 19% 17% 30% 
 
Considering the SFEM aggregations and forgiveness, it is unclear what the effect of making 
intentions explicit is: at b/c=1.5, forgiveness is most frequent when intentions are explicit; at 
b/c=4, forgiveness is least frequent when intentions are explicit.  
The results for descriptive statistics are somewhat more consistent. To measure forgiveness using 
descriptive statistics, we first identify all histories in which (i) at least one subject chose C in the 
first period, (ii) in at least one previous period, the initially cooperative subject chose C while the 
other subject chose D and (iii) in the immediately previous period the formerly cooperative 
subject played D. We then ask how frequently this formerly cooperative subject showed 
forgiveness by returning to C. We see that in both payoff specifications, forgiveness is similar in 
the explicit-intentions and the no-error conditions, and lower in the implicit-intentions control. 
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For Online Publication 
Online Appendix A: Decision time analysis regression tables 
Table OA1. Predicting cooperation based on decision time. Logistic regression with robust 
standard errors clustered on subject and pairing. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Last 4 Supergames All Supergames 
          
Decision time (log10(sec)) -0.937***  -0.977***  
 (0.214)  (0.168)  
Decision time (sec)  -0.0911***  -0.0991*** 
  (0.0275)  (0.0223) 
b/c 0.418*** 0.444*** 0.371*** 0.388*** 
 (0.0673) (0.0677) (0.0532) (0.0536) 
Supergame 0.0420 0.0383 0.0395*** 0.0419*** 
 (0.0371) (0.0376) (0.0118) (0.0119) 
Period -0.148*** -0.147*** -0.150*** -0.147*** 
 (0.0143) (0.0142) (0.0104) (0.0103) 
Explicit-Intentions 0.141 0.154 0.104 0.109 
 (0.257) (0.258) (0.195) (0.195) 
Implicit-Intentions -0.879*** -0.814*** -0.763*** -0.698*** 
 (0.220) (0.221) (0.161) (0.160) 
Constant 0.116 -0.0663 0.227 0.0120 
 (0.357) (0.358) (0.206) (0.202) 
     
Observations 11,537 11,604 28,501 28,664 
Subject-clusters 338 338 338 338 
Pairing-clusters 676 676 1741 1741 
Standard errors in parentheses     
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1    
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Table OA2. Predicting decision time by supergame. Linear regression with robust standard errors 
clustered on subject and pairing. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 
Explicit-
Intentions No-Error 
Implicit-
Intentions 
Implicit-
Intentions 
Implicit-
Intentions 
Implicit-
Intentions 
Implicit-
Intentions 
 
All 
subjects All subjects All subjects All subjects All subjects 
 
>67%C 
Subjects 
>67%C 
Subjects 
                
Supergame 
-
0.0126*** -0.00998*** 0.00672*** 0.0163*** 0.0191*** -0.000265 0.00261 
 (0.00140) (0.00219) (0.00169) (0.00360) (0.00396) (0.00192) (0.00200) 
b/c -0.00536 -0.0576*** 0.0240** 0.0414*** 0.0368*** 0.0294 0.0201 
 (0.00782) (0.00673) (0.0113) (0.0132) (0.0137) (0.0197) (0.0195) 
Period 
-
0.0093*** -0.00421*** -0.0114*** -0.00858*** -0.000738 -0.0102*** -0.00274 
 (0.00119) (0.00111) (0.00139) (0.00104) (0.00103) (0.00168) (0.00169) 
Your Intended 
Decision -0.0208 -0.0411*** -0.0923*** -0.0119 -0.00924 0.00537 0.00211 
 (0.0144) (0.0122) (0.0206) (0.00765) (0.00892) (0.0140) (0.0124) 
Your C Frequency    -0.138*** -0.129** -0.588*** -0.496** 
    (0.0535) (0.0564) (0.221) (0.209) 
Supergame X Your C 
Freq    -0.0199*** -0.0198***   
    (0.00549) (0.00612)   
Prev Partner's First 
Move     -0.0239*  -0.0167 
     (0.0124)  (0.0125) 
Partner's Intention 
Last Period     -0.0159*  0.00647 
     (0.00823)  (0.00962) 
Constant 0.374*** 0.493*** 0.199*** 0.160*** 0.107*** 0.548*** 0.439*** 
 (0.0285) (0.0267) (0.0297) (0.0341) (0.0392) (0.142) (0.136) 
        
Observations 6,552 6,466 15,483 15,483 12,545 4,866 3,949 
Subject-clusters 84 92 162 162 162 50 50 
Pairing-clusters 404 396 941 941 849 452 410 
R-squared 0.061 0.155 0.034 0.072 0.074 0.042 0.026 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Online Appendix B: Experimental Instructions  
Main treatments (Explicit intentions) 
Instructions: 
Thank you for participating in this experiment. 
 
Please read the following instructions carefully. If you have any questions, do not hesitate to ask 
us. Aside from this, no communication is allowed during the experiment. 
 
This experiment is about decision making. You will be randomly matched with other people in 
the room. None of you will ever know the identity of the others. Everyone will receive a fixed 
show-up amount of $10 for participating in the experiment. In addition, you will be able to earn 
more money based on the decisions you and others make in the experiment. Everything will be 
paid to you in cash immediately after the experiment.  
 
You will interact numerous times with different people. Based on the choices made by you and 
the other participants over the course of these interactions, you will receive between $0 and $30, 
in addition to the $10 show-up amount. 
 
You begin the session with 50 units in your account. Units are then added and/or subtracted to 
that amount over the course of the session as described below. At the end of the session, the total 
number of units in your account will be converted into cash at an exchange rate of 30 units = $1. 
 
The Session: 
 
The session is divided into a series of interactions between you and other participants in the 
room. 
 
In each interaction, you play a random number of rounds with another person. In each round you 
and the person you are interacting with can choose one of two options. Once the interaction ends, 
you get randomly re-matched with another person in the room to play another interaction. 
 
The setup will now be explained in more detail. 
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The round 
 
In each round of the experiment, the same two possible options are available to both you and the 
other person you interact with: A or B.  
 
The payoffs of the options (in units) 
 
 
Option   You  The other person  
 will get  will get 
 
A:  −2 +8  
 
B:  0  0 
 
If your move is A then you will get −2 units, and the other person will get +8 units. 
 
If you move is B then you will get 0 units, and the other person will get 0 units. 
 
Calculation of your income in each round:  
 
Your income in each round is the sum of two components: 
• the number of units you get from the move you played 
• the number of units you get from the move played by the other person. 
 
Your round-total income for each possible action by you and the other player is thus 
 
            Other person 
  A B 
You A +6 -2 
 B +8 0 
 
 
For example:  
If you play A and the other person plays A, you would both get +6 units. 
If you play A and the other person plays B, you would get -2 units, and they would get +8 units. 
If you play B and the other person plays A, you would get +8 units, and they would get -2 units. 
If you play B and the other person plays B, you would both get 0 units. 
 
Your income for each round will be calculated and presented to you on your computer screen. 
 
The total number of units you have at the end of the session will determine how much money 
you earn, at an exchange rate of 30 units = $1. 
 
Each round you must enter your choice within 30 seconds, or a random choice will be made.
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A chance that the your choice is changed  
 
There is a 7/8 probability that the move you choose actually occurs. But with probability 1/8, 
your move is changed to the opposite of what you picked. That is: 
 
When you choose A, there is a 7/8 chance that you will actually play A, and 1/8 chance that 
instead you play B. The same is true for the other player. 
 
When you choose B, there is a 7/8 chance that you will actually play B, and 1/8 chance that 
instead you play A. The same is true for the other player. 
 
Both players are informed of the moves which actually occur, as well as the moves chosen by 
each player. Thus with 1/8 probability, an error in execution occurs, and you know whether the 
other person’s action was what they chose, or an error. 
 
For example, if you choose A and the other player chooses B then: 
 
• With probability (7/8)*(7/8)=0.766, no changes occur. You will both be told that your 
move is A and the other person’s move is B, and that you chose A and the other person chose B. 
You will get -2 units, and the other player will get +8 units. 
 
• With probability (7/8)*(1/8)=0.109, the other person’s move is changed. You will both be 
told that your move is A and the other person’s move is A, and that you chose A and the other 
person chose B. You both will get +6 units.  
 
• With probability (1/8)*(7/8)=0.109, your move is changed. You will both be told that 
your move is B and the other person’s move is B, and that you chose A and the other person 
chose B. You will both get +0 units. 
 
• With probability (1/8)*(1/8)=0.016, both your move and the other person’s moves are 
changed. You will both be told that your move is B and the other person’s move is A, and that 
you chose A and the other person chose B. You will get +8 units and the other person will get -2 
units. 
 
 
 
 
Random number of rounds in each interaction 
 
After each round, there is a 7/8 probability of another round, and 1/8 probability that the 
interaction will end. Successive rounds will occur with probability 7/8 each time, until the 
interaction ends (with probability 1/8 after each round). Once the interaction ends, you will be 
randomly re-matched with a different person in the room for another interaction. Each interaction 
has the same setup. You will play a number of such interactions with different people.  
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Summary 
 
To summarize, every interaction you have with another person in the experiment includes a 
random number of rounds. After every round, there is a 7/8 probability of another round. There 
will be a number of such interactions, and your behavior has no effect on the number of rounds 
or the number of interactions.  
 
There is a 1/8 probability that the option you choose will not happen and the opposite option 
occurs instead, and the same is true for the person you interact with. You will be told which 
moves actually occur, and you will know what move the other person actually chose. 
 
At the beginning of the session, you have 50 units in your account. At the end of the session, you 
will receive $1 for every 30 units in your account. 
 
 
You will now take a very short quiz to make sure you understand the setup. 
 
The session will then begin with one practice round. This round will not count towards your final 
payoff. 
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Screenshot of the information screen: 
Explicit intentions 
 
Implicit intentions: 
 
No error: 
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Amazon Mechanical Turk test of the framing of the error term  
 
Error condition: 
 
 
 
[New page] 
 
 
 
46 
 
Lottery condition: 
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